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"THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE WORLDS"': BALANCING
VICTIMS' AND DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS IN THE
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASE
MERIDITH FELISE SOPHER
INTRODUCTION
"It hurts emotionally, and it hurts physically and once that happens, once
that intercourse or that molestation takes place, that's the end of childhood.
We know that."
2
"There are a lot of people who sexually offend their own children who are
excellent parents, despite that one little hangup.... People think the worst
thing that can happen to you is sexual abuse, but it's not. It's being removed
from your parents."3
Although the views expressed above are clearly contradictory, they
share the emotional fervor characteristic of the topic of child molesta-
tion. The past two decades have witnessed the birth of both the battle
against child sexual abuse4 and the backlash against that battle.5
Although child molestation has existed throughout history,6 the hor-
rific nature of the crime traditionally discouraged its recognition.7 In
the last ten years, however, the American media has focused intently
on the issue of child sexual abuse. The coverage is overwhelming-
1. Kee MacFarlane et al., Sexual Abuse of Young Children 87 (1986). For the
complete passage, see infra note 95 and accompanying text.
2. David HechIer, The Battle and the Backlash: The Child Sexual Abuse War
274 (1988) (quoting incest survivor Eileen Wolfe, interviewed Dec. 14, 1986).
3. Hechler, supra note 2, at 126 (quoting Marilyn Gunther, founder and director
of The Coalition of Concerned Citizens, a Seattle-based organization that defends
those accused of child abuse).
4. The term "child sexual abuse" is used to describe many acts. For example, the
federal statute includes child pornography within its definition. 42 U.S.C. § 5106g(7)
(1989). For the purposes of this Note, however, "child sexual abuse" and "child mo-
lestation" will refer only to forced or coerced sexual activity between a person less
than 16 years old and a substantially older person.
5. See Hechler, supra note 2, at 5-10.
6. See Florence Rush, The Best Kept Secret: Sexual Abuse of Children (1980)
(tracing the existence of child sexual abuse from pre-biblical times to the present); see
also James Selkin, The Child Sexual Abuse Case in the Courtroom 5-9 (2d ed. 1991)
(demonstrating the existence of child molestation in ancient Greece); Karla Dee-
Clark, Note, Innocent Victims and Blind Justice: Children's Rights to Be Free From
Child Sexual Abuse, 7 J. Hum. Rts. 214, 222 (1990) (same).
7. The writings of Sigmund Freud provide one of the most dramatic examples of
this self-imposed societal ignorance. Many of Freud's adult female patients reported
that they had been molested as children. Freud attributed these reports to fantasy,
concluding that "it was hardly credible that perverse acts against children were so
general." Sigmund Freud, The Origins of Psychoanalysis: Letters to Wilheim Fliess,
Drafts and Notes: 1887-1902 215 (1954). Freud's conclusions were accepted for most
of the twentieth century.
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magazine covers,8 newspaper articles, 9 television programs10 and ce-
lebrity confessions" relate stories of child molestation almost daily.
Furthermore, the number of cases reported to authorities has steadily
increased-over 200% in ten years. 2 This dramatic shift has pro-
8. See, e.g., Bill Hewitt et al., Dodging the Bullet, People, Feb. 7, 1994, at 64
(cover story about allegations of child molestation against Michael Jackson); Miriam
Horn, Memories Lost and Found, U.S. News & World Rep., Nov. 29, 1993, at 52
(cover story about recovered memories of child sexual abuse); Leon Jaroff, Lies of the
Mind, Time, Nov. 29, 1993, at 52 (cover story about repressed-memory therapy, focus-
ing on its effect in the molestation arena).
9. See, e.g., Wendy Bounds, Can a 3-Year-Old Murder? Is a Court The Place to
Decide?, Wall St. J., Mar. 3, 1994, at Al, A6 (identifying child as victim of sexual
abuse); Karen Brandon, Owner of Vernon Hills Tutoring Center Charged with Moles-
tation, Chi. Trib., Mar. 12, 1994, at 5 (owner of tutoring facility charged with child
sexual abuse); Robert Enstad, Father Charged in AIDS Case, Chi. Trib., Feb. 24, 1994,
at 2 (HIV-positive man charged with molesting his daughter); Jon Jeter, P. G. Man Is
Convicted Of Sexually Abusing Boy, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1994, at B5 (conviction of
alleged child molester); Bill Miller, Woman Says Alexandria Priest Initiated Sex With
Her When She Was 13, Wash. Post., Feb. 6, 1994, at B5 (allegations of child sexual
abuse); Ann W. O'Neill, Panah Pleads Not Guilty in Girl's Death, L.A. Times, Feb.
26, 1994, at B1 (man charged with molesting and murdering eight-year-old girl);
Michael D. Shear, GMU Student Charged with Sexual Abuse of Boy, 13, Wash. Post,
Mar. 22, 1994, at B6 (arrest of suspect in child molestation case); Wayland Man Jailed
for Abuse, Boston Globe, Feb. 1, 1994, at 25 (defendant pleads guilty to sexually abus-
ing three boys). The American media is not alone in its coverage of these cases. See,
e.g., Rachel Hawes, Judge Calls for Uniform Child Law, The Weekend Australian,
Mar. 19-20, 1994, at 4 (reporting on child sexual abuse cases within Australia's legal
system); D'arcy Jenish et al., Every Parent's Nightmare, Maclean's, June 22, 1992, at 24
(cover story about the problem of child sexual abuse in Canada).
10. For example, Ofra Bickel's recent documentary, Innocence Lost: The Verdict,
questioned the fairness of the Little Rascals Day Care case, in which two employees
were convicted of molesting preschool-age children. The documentary aired on 290
public broadcasting stations during the summer of 1993. See also Ronald Smothers,
In a Day-Care Case, New Questions, Few Answers, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1993, at B7
(criticizing the outcome of the Little Rascals Day Care case and describing Innocence
Lost). The major networks also are broadcasting documentaries on the issue of child
sexual abuse, and have aired countless television movies on the subject over the years.
See, e.g., Not In My Family (ABC television broadcast, Feb. 28, 1993); Shattered Trust
(NBC television broadcast, Sept. 27, 1993); Ultimate Betrayal (CBS television broad-
cast, Mar. 20, 1994); see also John Carmody, The TV Column, Wash. Post., Aug. 27,
1984, at C9 (reporting ratings for an NBC documentary on child molestation).
11. See, e.g., Roseanne Arnold & Vickie Bane, A Star Cries Incest, People, Oct. 7,
1991, at 84 (discussing comedienne Roseanne Arnold's claims that she was molested
repeatedly as a child); Sandra Dee & Todd Gold, Learning to Live Again, People,
Mar. 18, 1991, at 86 (reporting that actress Sandra Dee was sexually abused as a
child); Linda Grant, A Past Imperfect?, The Guardian, May 24, 1993, § 2, at 10
("[S]cores of celebrities, from Sindad O'Connor to Roseanne Arnold, have gone on
the record to claim that they were abused."); David Mills, Oprah, Children's
Crusader, Wash. Post, Nov. 13, 1991, at Bi (reporting talk-show host Oprah Winfrey
admission that she is a survivor of child sexual abuse); Sylvia Rubin, Sharing an Awful
Secret, S.F. Chron., Oct. 9, 1991, at B3 ("From the covers of magazines, on talk shows
and in their autobiographies, celebrities are telling the world about their abusive
childhoods. The last few weeks have brought an unprecedented number of celebrity
confessions . . ").
12. State v. Myatt, 697 P.2d 836, 841 (Kan. 1985). As of 1989, molestation was the
fastest growing form of reported child abuse. L. Matthew Duggan III et al., The Cred-
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duced a vociferous backlash, with many characterizing the growing
concern as "mass hysteria.' ' 3
Nonetheless, "the routine occurrence of child molestation remains a
subject from which people prefer to avert their eyes." 4 Only the most
dramatic cases come to the public's attention, and popular myths re-
main undisturbed. 15 Government statistics on child molestation are
scarce,16 and researchers' attempts to compile data yield unsatisfac-
tory results. 7 Child sexual abuse is extremely difficult to investigate.
It is a crime of secrecy, with victims who are always unwilling, and
ibility of Children as Witnesses in a Simulated Child Sex Abuse Trial, in Perspectives
on Children's Testimony 71, 72 (Stephen J. Ceci et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter Perspec-
tives]; see also Doris Stevens & Lucy Berliner, Special Techniques for Child Witnesses,
in The Sexual Victimology of Youth 246, 246 (Leroy Schultz ed. 1980) (noting a
steady increase in the number of child sexual abuse victims referred to the Sexual
Assault Center).
13. Maryanne George, Experts Say Michigan Has Far to Go to Help Victins, Det.
Free Press, Apr. 12, 1993, at Al. Ms. George quotes Dr. Richard Gardner, who has
testified for the defense in child sexual abuse cases for over 10 years. Dr. Gardner
states:
It used to be the Nazis, now it is sex abuse. There's a mass hysteria. The
1974 Federal Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, which requires
reporting, has drawn in zealots, people with axes to grind and validators who
know if you document abuse, it will keep your clinic open.
Id. See also Michael H. Graham, Indicia of Reliability and Face to Face Confrontation:
Emerging Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 40 U. Miami L Rev. 19, 20(1985) ("The last three years have brought the public to a state of awareness, often
bordering on hysteria, concerning child sexual abuse."); Laura Shapiro et al., Rush to
Judgment, Newsweek, Apr. 19, 1993, at 54 ("Americans are at fever pitch over child
sex abuse these days: we haven't done very well at preventing it, but we're frantic to
root it out and stomp it to death no matter where it lurks-or doesn't."). Some critics
have even compared the increased attention to McCarthyism and the Salem Witch
Trials. See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
14. Susan Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men, Women, and Rape 301 (1975).
15. Mary de Young, The Sexual Victimization of Children 161 (1982). Among the
most common myths are that children are molested primarily by strangers and that
only girls are victims of sexual abuse. David Finklehor, Child Sexual Abuse: New
Theory and Research 87 (1984).
16. See Billie W. Dziech & Charles B. Schudson, On Trial: America's Courts and
Their Treatment of Sexually Abused Children 4 (2d ed. 1991).
17. MacFarlane et al., supra note 1, at 6 ("[E]stimates of the incidence of sexual
abuse vary dramatically.... In terms of absolute numbers, current reliable estimates
range from 100,000 to 500,000 cases per year.... [P]roportions of people reporting
sexual contact with an adult prior to puberty or late adolescence range from about
8% to 35%.") See also Debra Whitcomb et al., When the Victim is a Child: Issues for
Judges and Prosecutors 2-4 (1985) ("[Findings suggest that anywhere from 12% to
38% of all women, and from 3% to 15% of men, are subjected to some form of sexual
abuse in their childhood."); David McCord, Expert Psychological Testimony About
Child Complainants in Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: A Foray into the Admissibility of
Novel Psychological Evidence, 77 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1, 3 (1986) (citing studies
that conclude that anywhere from 8% to 28% of women were sexually abused as
children); John E.B. Myers, Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse in Custody and Visita-
tion Litigation: Recommendations for Improved Fact Finding and Child Protection,
28 J. Fam. L. 1, 3 (1989) ("It is difficult to estimate how many children are sexually
abused each year."). This statistical uncertainty is partially attributable to the under-
reporting of molestation. Rush, supra note 6, at 4.
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often unable, to disclose what has happened. 8 Physical evidence of
the abuse exists only in a small percentage of cases,' 9 and witnesses
are even less common.2" These factors hinder the truth-seeking pro-
cess at all levels-from the statistics lab to the courtroom.
This Note addresses the difficulties encountered in the effective ad-
judication of child sexual abuse cases within the American criminal
justice system, and argues for an interdisciplinary2' effort to overcome
evidentiary hurdles. Part I of this Note discusses whether the criminal
courts should have a role in combatting child molestation. This Part
identifies the arguments for and against criminal prosecution of the
alleged abuser, particularly where the abuse is intrafamilial,22 and con-
cludes that prosecution is crucial in the majority of cases. Part II ex-
amines the evidentiary difficulties involved in these prosecutions in
light of the constitutional protections afforded the criminal defendant.
These protections make the complainant's success in the criminal
arena considerably more difficult than in civil court. This Part also
demonstrates how traditional prosecutorial techniques have failed in
this arena. Part III advocates the implementation of an interdiscipli-
nary approach to these prosecutions. While such an approach has
been successfully instituted in several jurisdictions, most jurisdictions
have limited their efforts to the civil arena. Furthermore, the poten-
tial of this approach as a tool for overcoming evidentiary hurdles has
not been explored. A "team effort" diminishes many of the eviden-
tiary problems encountered in these prosecutions. This Note con-
cludes that a streamlined, interdisciplinary approach to prosecution of
child sexual abuse cases benefits both victim and defendant. This ap-
proach minimizes potential revictimization of the child without sacri-
ficing the defendant's constitutional rights. Ultimately, the justice
system cannot effectively handle child sexual abuse cases until crimi-
nal prosecution is restructured to meet the particular needs of these
cases.
18. See infra notes 74, 78-81 and accompanying text; see also Roland Summit, No
One Invented McMartin 'Secret', L.A. Times, Feb. 5, 1986, § 2, at 5 ("Children who
have been molested are typically ashamed, fearful and specifically forbidden to tell...
. It is simply not normal for a child to tell, or for a parent to believe, that a solid
citizen could be sexually dangerous.").
19. See infra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
21. This Note uses the term "interdisciplinary" to connote cooperation among the
various persons involved in the investigation and prosecution of a child sexual abuse
case, e.g., physicians, psychologists, police officers and lawyers.
22. This Note uses the term "intrafamilial" to include abuse perpetrated by those
living in the same household as the victim, and not cases involving extended family
members outside the household.
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I. THE ROLE OF THE CRIMINAL COURTS IN
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES
Even among those committed to battling child sexual abuse, there is
much debate over whether molesters should be treated as criminals.
Society traditionally has viewed all forms of child abuse as a behav-
ioral disorder rather than a criminal activity.23 Where the abuse is
intrafamilial, this perception has resulted in an approach that focuses
on treating the "sick" family member while preserving the family
structure. 4 Therefore, until recently, intrusion by criminal authorities
was minimal.'
Heightened public awareness of child abuse has led to a concomi-
tant increase in the number of abuse prosecutions, most notably in the
area of molestation.26 While all child advocates welcome the in-
creased recognition of child sexual abuse, they are divided sharply as
to the proper role of the criminal system in this arena.2 7 For some,
concern for the child victim reinforces the traditional notion that these
cases, particularly where the abuse is incestuous, should not be crimi-
nally prosecuted.
A. Arguments Against Criminal Prosecution
Many child protective professionals argue that criminal prosecution
is an inappropriate response to child sexual abuse. These profession-
als principally contend that any state action should be directed at en-
suring the welfare of the child victim.' Criminal courts lack authority
to issue orders regarding the complainant, and prosecution is aimed at
deterring, punishing, and rehabilitating the defendant. Those who
identify molestation as a psycho-social problem question the effective-
23. Ellen Gray, Unequal Justice 13 (1993); Laurie S. Boerma, How to Overcome
Barriers and to Develop Creative and Innovative Approades in the Prosecution of
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in Papers from a National Policy Conference on Legal
Reforms in Child Sexual Abuse Cases 31, 32 (National Legal Resource Center for
Child Advocacy and Protection 1985) [hereinafter National Conference].
24. Gray, supra note 23, at 13.
25. Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse: Arrest and Prosecution Decision-Making,
24 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 315, 318-19 (1987); John P. Serketich, Note, A Conflict of Inter-
ests: The Constitutionality of Closed-Circuit Television in Child Sexual Abuse Cases,
27 Val. U. L. Rev. 217, 217 (1992).
26. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
27. See infra notes 27-65 and accompanying text. Sometimes civil suits provide
the only available remedy-often abuse is not discovered until adulthood, long after
the criminal statute of limitations has expired. For a discussion of the issues raised in
these cases, see generally Lisa Bickel, Note, Tolling the Statute of Limitations in Ac-
tions Brought by Adult Survivors of Childhood Sexual Abuse, 33 Ariz. L. Rev. 427
(1991). This Note is concerned only with those cases where the victim has the option
of filing a criminal complaint.
28. David Libai, The Protection of the Child Victim of a Sexual Offense in ie
Criminal Justice System, 15 Wayne L. Rev. 977, 978 (1969); William W. Patton, Child
Abuse: The Irreconciliable Differences Benveen Criminal Prosecution and Informal
Dependency Court Mediation, 31 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 37, 41 (1992).
1994]
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ness of criminal prosecution as a means of deterrence or rehabilita-
tion. 9 They further argue that those convicted usually serve only a
short sentence, and are likely to resume abusive behavior upon
release. 30
Furthermore, criminal prosecution may carry a significant emo-
tional cost for the child witness. The criminal system's defendant-ori-
ented procedures discourage, and often disallow, the court from
accommodating children's special needs. For example, the Sixth
Amendment right to confrontation, which is not implicated in civil
proceedings, may require the child to face the defendant-an often
traumatic experience. 3' The emotional difficulty is heightened when
the alleged abuser is a family member. In such a case, the child may
feel additional guilt if the defendant is convicted.31 Conflicting feel-
ings toward the abuser are often a significant cause of the trauma ex-
perienced by the child victim. 33
Authorities who dismiss the role of criminal courts in dealing with
intrafamilial child sexual abuse generally advocate the use of the civil
system in these cases. Civil proceedings may take two forms.34 First,
a parent or guardian may sue on behalf of the child to obtain money
damages from the alleged wrongdoer.35 Although the tangible result
is only monetary, such a suit arguably has psychological benefits for
the child victim. 36 Second, a civil suit may be instituted by the appro-
priate state agency against the alleged abuser.37 This type of case,
often brought in family or juvenile court,38 is often the fastest means
of removing the child from an abusive environment. In contrast to
29. Howard A. Davidson et al., Child Abuse and Neglect Litigation: A Manual
for Judges 143 (1981).
30. Ronald M. Holmes, The Sex Offender and the Criminal Justice System 171
(1983); Brian G. Fraser, A Pragmatic Alternative to Current Legislative Approaches to
Child Abuse, 12 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 103, 119 (1974).
31. See infra part II.B.
32. Josephine Bulkley et al., Dealing With Child Sexual Abuse 7 (2d ed. 1982);
Diana S. Everstine & Louis Everstine, Sexual Trauma in Children and Adolescents
183 (1989).
33. Everstine & Everstine, supra note 32, at 183.
34. Custody disputes that involve allegations of molestation are not included be-
cause they are not proceedings specifically designed to deal with the abuse.
35. Hechler, supra note 2, at 56.
36. See id. at 237 (noting that a victim's therapist viewed victorious lawsuit as "the
first step in her patient's struggle to change 'from victim to survivor' ").
37. Id. at 56-58.
38. The courts hosting these cases are different in different jurisdictions. They are
most commonly brought in family court. In other states, however, juvenile courts
have jurisdiction over abused and neglected children. Because the juvenile court's
purpose is to implement nonpunitive, individualized justice for children, the focus is
on help and treatment, not punishment. Vincent DeFrancis, The Court and Protec-
tive Services: Their Respective Roles 10-16, reprinted in Davidson et al., supra note
29, at 27-28. See generally Juvenile Justice Philosophy (Frederic L. Faust & Paul J.
Brantingham eds., 2d ed. 1979) (describing the evolution of the juvenile court
system).
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criminal trials, these proceedings may focus on the "best interests of
the child" to protect the victim from further harm.39 Civil court action
also is facilitated by the standard of proof, which is considerably lower
than that required in a criminal trial.40 Following a showing of abuse
by a preponderance of the evidence, the civil court can take the neces-
sary steps to ensure the child's safety.4 For example, the court may
order child protective agencies to provide treatment for the child and
family members.4' The civil court therefore may address the root of
the abuse in a manner that the criminal system cannot.
Moreover, an attorney or guardian ad litem43 usually represents the
child in civil court." Federal statute mandates the appointment of a
guardian ad litem, who need not be an attorney, for all civil abuse
proceedings in states receiving federal block grant money.45 Many
states have similar statutes, often requiring that the ad litem be an
attorney.' Under both schemes, an effective ad litem ensures that the
child's interests are represented at all stages of the adjudicatory pro-
cess. The ad litem is not the child's mouthpiece-he or she deter-
39. Bulkley et al., supra note 32, at 5; Jeffry H. Gallet, Judicial Management of
Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 23 Fam. L.Q. 477, 477 (1989).
40. Hechler, supra note 2, at 60-61. In a criminal trial, the State must prove the
defendant's guilt "beyond a reasonable doubt." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970) (explicitly holding "that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against
conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged"). This is the highest evidentiary stan-
dard. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 186 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
41. Gallet, supra note 39, at 480; Dee-Clark, supra note 6, at 220-21. Some actions
require a greater showing than others. For example, the Supreme Court has held on
due process grounds that the termination of parental rights requires a minimum show-
ing of "clear and convincing evidence." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,769 (1982).
42. Hechler, supra note 2, at 61. The court's power to provide this type of remedy
is provided by state statute. See, eg., Cal. Family Code § 6343 (West 1994).
43. Guardians ad litemn who are attorneys are often referred to as "law guardians."
Hechler, supra note 2, at 349 n.7.
44. ABA, Recommendations for Improving Legal Intervention in Intrafamily
Child Sexual Abuse Cases 9 cmt. 1.4.1 (1982) [hereinafter ABA Recommendations].
45. 42 U.S.C. § 5103(b)(2)(G) (1974).
46. Twenty-six states require appointment of a guardian ad liten in all civil abuse
proceedings. See Ala. Code § 26-14-11 (1992); Cal. WeIlf. & Inst. Code § 326 (Vest
1984 & Supp. 1994); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 19-1-105 (West Supp. 1993); Conn. Gen.
Stat. Ann. § 17a-101 (West 1992); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-11-55 (1990); Idaho Code § 16-
1618 (1979 & Supp. 1994); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.71 (Vest 1994); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 26A.140 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 4005 (Vest
1992); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 210.160 (Vernon 1983 & Supp. 1994); Mont. Code Ann. § 41-
3-303 (1993); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-272.01 (1988); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 432B.500
(Michie 1991); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-8.23 (West 1993); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 32A-4-10
(Michie Supp. 1993); N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act. § 249 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1993); N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7A-586 (1989 & Supp. 1993); N.D. Cent. Code § 50-25.1-08 (1989); Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. § 2151.28.1 (Baldwin 1992); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 846 (\Vest 1983
& Supp. 1994); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6382 (1991); R.I. Gen. Laws § 40-11-14
(1990); S.C. Code Ann. § 20-7-110 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1993); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 37-1-149 (1991); Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-9 (Supp. 1994); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 13.34.100 (West 1993).
1994]
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mines what outcome will serve the child's best interests, and petitions
the court accordingly.4 7
Although the use of an ad litem has been recommended for criminal
sexual abuse proceedings, few courts appoint guardians ad litem in
criminal cases.48 The victim in a criminal trial is not a party to the
proceeding and therefore typically lacks representation-the rights of
the defendant take priority. To appoint a guardian ad litem may
prove, in effect, similar to appointing another prosecutor. This result
is appealing to no one-it infringes on the rights of the defendant and
thereby increases the likelihood of an overturned conviction.49 The
current resistance to the appointment of ad litems in criminal proceed-
ings is thus unlikely to subside significantly in the near future.
B. Arguments For Criminal Prosecution
Other child protective professionals strongly contest the idea of
eliminating criminal prosecution, asserting that it is not only an appro-
priate but a necessary means of combatting child molestation. They
argue that child sexual abuse must be treated as a crime, regardless of
any familial relationship between perpetrator and victim. 50 To sup-
port this position, proponents of prosecution cite the fact that all fifty
state legislatures have passed statutes that criminalize child molesta-
tion, regardless of the relationship of those involved.5 They maintain
that "[r]etribution is exceptionally important in view of the public per-
ception of child abuse as a heinous act."52 In other words, the justice
system must hold all offenders responsible for their actions in order to
demonstrate that sexual abuse of children is loathsome behavior.
These professionals also question the efficacy of court-ordered ther-
apy for sexual offenders. Most therapists maintain that involuntary
treament is ineffective, and hesitate to accept responsibility for the
prevention of future abuse.53 Some child interest advocates further
assert that molesters can only be deterred, not rehabilitated. 4 To sup-
47. See Hechler, supra note 2, at 62.
48. Mark Hardin, Guardians Ad Litem for Child Victims in Criminal Proceedings,
25 U. Louisville J. Fam. L. 687, 687 (1987); Tara Lea Mulhauser, From "Best" to "Bet-
ter": The Interests of Children and the Role of a Guardian Ad Litem, 66 N.D. L. Rev.
633, 643-47 (1990). Florida requires guardians ad litem in criminal proceedings as well
as civil. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 914.17 (West Supp. 1994).
49. Hardin, supra note 48, at 693.
50. Gray, supra note 23, at 14.
51. Irving J. Sloan, Child Abuse: Governing Law and Legislation 105 (1983); see
Davidson et al., supra note 29, at 142. However, most states also have statutes that
specifically prohibit incest, which carry lesser sentences than those for child molesta-
tion. M.P. Taylor, Keeping Vigil, The Dallas Morning News, Feb. 2, 1993, at C5.
52. Davidson et al., supra note 29, at 141.
53. Tilman Furniss, The Multi-professional Handbook of Child Sexual Abuse 313
(1991).
54. Id. at 34 ("[S]exual abusers are not 'cured' after successful treatment. In cir-
cumstances of stress and in situations which may give them the opportunity, sexual
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port this view, they cite studies that indicate no deviation from the
standard rate of recidivism in cases where psychiatric treatment is or-
dered." Because therapy is futile, they argue, only longer prison
sentences can keep children safe.56
Champions of both defendants' rights and the sanctity of the family
unit similarly support criminal prosecution, particularly in cases of in-
cest.57 Criminal prosecution affords the defendant full due process
rights and forces the state to prove sexual abuse beyond a reasonable
doubt.5 Separation of family members thus occurs only after the
strictest evidentiary standard has been met. A civil court, on the other
hand, often renders rulings based on a preponderance of the evi-
dence. 9 The criminal system better protects the falsely accused, as
well as the integrity of the family unit, than does the civil system.
The fundamental principle that both victims' and defendants' advo-
cates who support criminal action hold to is that child molestation
must be treated as other criminal acts. If the prison system is an effec-
tive deterrent,60 it follows that the threat of prosecution and convic-
tion will deter potential child abusers. Criminal prosecution is more
visible to the community than a civil suit and may serve as a warning
that this conduct will not be tolerated.61 In addition, prosecution sat-
isfies society's desire for justice. 2
The criminal system also may have advantages for the incest victim.
When a criminal arrest is made, police can remove the offender from
the home immediately and, if the judge sets high bail, for a substantial
period of time. The civil system, in contrast, may be unable to control
abusers can remain in danger of re-abusing again."); Holmes, supra note 30, at 167
(noting that sex offenders can be habilitated but not rehabilitated); Andrew Vachss,
Sex Predators Can't Be Saved, N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1993, at AI5 ("[Sex offenders]
can[not] be rehabilitated since they cannot return to a state that never existed.").
55. For example, Andrew Vachss cites a Canadian study that found a 43% recidi-
vism rate among child molesters regardless of therapy. Vachss, supra note 54, at A15.
Vachss also cites a study in which those offenders receiving treatment had a higher
recidivism rate than those who did not. Id But see Marti Kranzberg, Treatment Does
Help Sex Offenders, The Dallas Morning News, Feb. 28, 1993, at J6 ("Five studies
done between 1979 and 1991 have shown a low recidivism rate following treatment.").
56. See Vachss, supra note 54, at A15; cf President's Child Safety Partnership, A
Report to the President 8 (1987) [hereinafter President's Report) (emphasizing the
importance of punishing child abusers).
57. Cf. Davidson et al., supra note 29, at 146 (detailing different groups' argu-
ments in favor of the criminal system).
58. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
59. Hechler, supra note 2, at 61; see supra note 40 and accompanying text. There
also are fewer evidentiary restrictions in civil court than in criminal. See infra part
II.B.
60. The issue of whether our criminal system serves to deter potential offenders is
hotly debated, and is beyond the scope of this Note. For this discussion, the assump-
tion is that the criminal justice system, as currently constituted, is effective as a
deterrent.
61. President's Report, supra note 56, at 91-94; Fraser, supra note 30, at 121 n.66.
62. Fraser, supra note 30, at 121 n.66.
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the offender's actions, and therefore may place the child in foster care,
a step that fails to prevent the abuser from molesting other children.63
A conviction not only removes the perpetrator from society, but can
be therapeutic for the victim by placing the blame for the abuse on the
defendant.' 4
C. Conclusion
Ultimately, the exemption of any form of child molestation from
criminal classification cannot be justified. The hesitancy to prosecute
family members accused of molestation is similar to the traditional
refusal to acknowledge that a husband could rape his wife-it is mor-
ally unjustifiable.6" The argument for differentiation between incest
and other molestation is succinctly refuted by one attorney's state-
ment that "you should [not] get any immunity because you grew your
own victim."66 Despite the difficulties of prosecution, child sexual
abuse, in all its forms, must be treated as any other heinous crime.
II. PRESENT ATTEMPTS To MEET THE PARTICULAR NEEDS OF
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The evidentiary nature of a criminal proceeding is significantly
more complex than its civil counterpart. Although the Supreme Court
has stated that "[t]he basic purpose of a trial is the determination of
truth,"67 criminal justice clearly is predicated on notions other than
factual accuracy. Discovery of truth is not the primary concern of the
American criminal system.6" The criminal justice system prioritizes
63. Hechler, supra note 2, at 61. The foster care system also is criticized for its
negative impact on the children involved. Many are stuck in the "limbo" of the sys-
tem for years, where they rarely receive treatment and may be further abused.
Besharov, supra note 25, at 320. Foster care may therefore feel like punishment to the
child. One victim asked: "Why should I have been taken out of the home? I was the
victim. I had nothing. I did nothing wrong. My father should have been taken out,
not me." Whitcomb et al., supra note 17, at 6.
64. Whitcomb et al., supra note 17, at 7.
65. Statement of The Honorable Norman S. Early, Jr., District Attorney, Denver,
Colorado, in Symposium, Protecting Our Children in the Fight Against Molestation
30, 30 (1984) [hereinafter Symposium]. Mr. Early states, "[M]olestation is molesta-
tion, and.., a child's dreams and a child's heart, and the attitudes and the fears that a
child grows up with are there, regardless of the fact of whether we're dealing with a
grandfather or a stranger." Id.
66. Sherrye Henry, Suffer the Children: How the Legal System Fails Neglected and
Abused Children, Woman's Day, Oct. 30, 1990, at 52 (quoting attorney Andrew
Vachss).
67. Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
68. For a general discussion of this proposition, see Monroe H. Freedman, Judge
Frankel's Search for Truth, in Lawyers' Ethics 124 (Allan Gerson ed., 1980). Freed-
man writes: "[T]he constitutional rights that are provided by our system of justice
serve independent values that may well outweigh the truth-seeking value; a fact made
manifest when we realize that those rights, far from furthering the search for truth,
may well impede it." Id. at 126.
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process, often placing procedural ahead of substantive justice.69 The
pursuit of absolute truth-defined here as historical fact-is therefore
subordinated to considerations of individual dignity.7"
The constitutional protections afforded the criminal defendant
often translate into evidentiary limitations on the prosecution. These
limitations combine with the high burden of proof to make obtaining a
conviction a difficult task. This difficulty is increased in child sexual
abuse cases. Evidentiary hurdles join with Bill of Rights guarantees to
make it extremely hard to prove child molestation beyond a reason-
able doubt.7' Evidence in these cases is often scarce, and any existing
evidence may be excluded on hearsay grounds or effectively sup-
pressed by Confrontation Clause requirements.' Furthermore, the
reliability of the evidence is often far more difficult to assess than in
the average criminal case. The particularly difficult evidentiary nature
of these prosecutions has led to erroneous convictions and acquit-
tals.73 Recognizing these problems, courts and legislatures have taken
various steps to accommodate these cases.
A. Evidentiary Difficulties in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
The Supreme Court has recognized child abuse as "one of the most
difficult crimes to detect and prosecute, in large part because there are
often no witnesses except the victim."'74 Where the abuse is sexual,
the difficulty is even greater, and the likelihood of eyewitnesses is de-
creased.7 5 Sexual abuse almost invariably occurs in secret.76
69. Procedural justice refers to "the mechanisms and processes by which society
enforces its substantive law and deals with those who violate that law." N. Gary
Holten & Lawson L. Lamar, The Criminal Courts: Structures, Personnel, and
Processes 9 (1991). Substantive justice, on the other hand, concerns the substance of
the laws themselves as determined by societal values. In the criminal context, there-
fore, substantive justice refers to the acts prohibited and the sanctions provided. It is
primarily concerned with questions of fact, such as whether the acts alleged were ac-
tually committed. Id. at 8-9.
70. Freedman, supra note 68, at 127.
71. See infra part II; see also Sol Taylor, Letter to the Editor, LA. Times, Feb. 1,
1986, § 2, at 2 ("The truth is that in this type of crime the victim has far less chance at
seeing justice done than in almost any other, including rape."). These difficulties
often prevent the district attorney from prosecuting at all. According to the director
of the National Institute of Justice, fewer than 10% of all child abuse cases went
forward to prosecution as of 1985. Whitcomb et al., supra note 17, at i. This statistic
has hardly changed-prosecutors remain extremely hestitant to bring these cases to
trial. Gray, supra note 23, at 17.
72. See infra part II.B.
73. See infra part II.D.
74. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 (1987).
75. See People v. McClure, 779 P.2d 864, 866 (Colo. 1989) (en banc); In re Nicole
V., 518 N.E.2d 914, 915 (N.Y. 1987); State v. Jones, 772 P.2d 496, 499 (Wash. 1989)
(en banc); Doris Stevens & Lucy Berliner, Special Techniques for Child Witnesses, in
The Sexual Victimology of Youth, supra note 12, at 246, 248.
76. Judy Yun, Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child Hearsay Statements in
Sex Abuse Cases, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1745, 1750 (1983); see also Roland C. Summit,
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The scarcity of physical evidence further hinders both detection and
prosecution. Physical signs of molestation are rare-medical exami-
nations reveal evidence of sexual abuse in only twenty to thirty per-
cent of victims.7 7 Delays in reporting the abuse, which are common,
decrease the likelihood of discovering physical proof.78 As a result,
the only evidence usually comes from the child, whose ability to com-
municate effectively may be hampered by several factors.
First, testifying in court is an unpleasant experience for any witness,
but it can be extremely traumatic for a child. Children typically are
unfamiliar with the legal system, and often fail to understand the na-
ture and purpose of a trial.79 Some children mistakenly believe that
the judge is there to punish them.8" The formality of the courtroom
setting may frighten them to the point where they are unable or un-
willing to testify truthfully."' These fears are compounded by the
close proximity of the defendant in the courtroom. 2
There also is growing concern that a child's memory may be con-
fused by the months of interviews that follow the reporting of abuse.
Recent findings indicate that interviewing methods designed to dis-
cover the truth in these cases may in fact irretrievably bury that truth.
In one highly publicized study, children aged four to six were repeat-
The Child Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome, 7 Child Abuse & Neglect 177,
181 (1983) ("[Clhild sexual abuse ... happens only when the child is alone.").
77. Furniss, supra note 53, at 214; William F. Enos et al., Forensic Evaluation of
the Sexually Abused Child, 78 Pediatrics 385, 386 (1986); William N. Marshall, Jr., et
al., New Child Abuse Spectrum in an Era of Increased Awareness, 142 Am. J. Diseases
Children 664, 665 (1988). See also Gail S. Goodman & Alison Clarke-Stewart, Sug.
gestibility in Children's Testimony: Implications for Sexual Abuse Investigations, in
The Suggestibility of Children's Recollections 92, 93 (John Doris ed., 1991) (hereinaf-
ter Recollections] ("[U]nlike many other crimes, sexual abuse of children often leaves
no physical evidence and excludes other witnesses and thus pits a child's word against
that of the accused."); John McCann, et al., Labial Adhesions and Posterior Fourchette
Injuries in Childhood Sexual Abuse, 142 Am. J. Diseases Children 659, 659 (1988)
("The search for findings that may be considered conclusive physical evidence of sex-
ual abuse in children suspected of having been molested is a difficult and oftentimes a
perplexing task."). But see Mary E. Rimsza & Elaine H. Niggemann, Medical Evalua-
tion of Sexually Abused Children: A Review of 311 Cases, 69 Pediatrics 8, 10 (1982)
(finding that only 23% of victims show no physical abnormalities).
78. Carolyn J. Levitt, Sexual Abuse in Children, 80 Postgraduate Med. 201, 202
(1986).
79. Karen J. Saywitz, Children's Conceptions of the Legal System: "Court Is a
Place to Play Basketball," in Perspectives, supra note 12, at 136, 149-50; Amye War-
ren-Leubecker et al., What Do Children Know About the Legal System and When Do
They Know It? First Steps Down a Less Traveled Path in Child Witness Research, in
Perspectives, supra note 12, at 158, 180.
80. See Warren-Leubecker et al., supra note 79, at 158, 159.
81. Whitcomb et al., supra note 17, at 18; see Dominic J. Fot6, Note, Child Wit.
nesses in Sexual Abuse Criminal Proceedings: Their Capabilities, Special Problems,
and Proposals for Reform, 13 Pepp. L. Rev. 157, 164-65 (1985). The Supreme Court
recently addressed children's fear of confronting defendants in Maryland v. Craig, 497
U.S. 836 (1990). See infra notes 114, 116-22 and accompanying text.
82. Whitcomb et al., supra note 17, at 17-18.
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edly questioned about events that had not occurred.' By the elev-
enth week, fifty-six percent of the children claimed that at least one
false event was true.s4 Furthermore, child abuse professionals were
able to discern which statements were false only one-third of the
time.s5 These studies have led some critics to assert that the majority
of child abuse allegations are fabricated, analogizing the nation's
"child sexual abuse hysteria" to the Salem Witch Trials and
McCarthyism.8 6
Although these comparisons are extreme, they illustrate a real di-
lemma facing child abuse professionals. Most researchers dispute the
contention that the majority of child abuse claims are fabricated;'
nonetheless, they cannot deny that suggestion may occur during the
interview process. For example, psychologists conducted a study in
which a pediatrician examined seventy-two girls aged four to seven.'
All of the girls were naked during the examination, but only half re-
ceived a genital checkup. 9 In subsequent interviews, none of the chil-
dren revealed the genital touching until specifically asked." Three of
the girls, misled by specific questioning, falsely reported that they had
been genitally examined.9 The researchers concluded that although
specific questioning may increase the chance of obtaining a false re-
port, children may not disclose genital contact unless specifically
asked.92 Furthermore, "when all of the chances to reveal genital/anal
83. Daniel Goleman, Studies Reveal Suggestibility of Very Young as Witnesses,
N.Y. Times, June 11, 1993, at Al, A23.
84. Id. at A23.
85. Id
86. Rorie Sherman, Gardner's Law, Nat'l LJ., Aug. 16, 1993, at 1; Hechler, supra
note 2, at 4.
87. See, e.g., ABA, Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting and Investigation: Policy
Guidelines for Decision Making 12 (Rapporteur Douglas J. Besharov 1988) (estimat-
ing that between four and ten percent of sexual abuse reports are fictitious); David
P.H. Jones & J. Melbourne McGraw, Reliable and Fictitious Accounts of Sexual Abuse
to Children, 2 J. Interpersonal Violence 27, 31 (1987) (finding only eight percent of
reports to the Denver Social Services Department in 1983 to be fictitious). The mis-
conception that most reports are fabricated is partly attributable to the lack of distinc-
tion between those reports that are deliberate falsehoods and those that are simply
unsubstantiated. Many reports remain unproven due to insufficient evidence; how-
ever, there is rarely any indication that these reports were deliberately fabricated. 1
John E.B. Myers, Evidence in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases § 4.4, at 227 (2d ed.
1992). Furthermore, fabrication, which implies intent, should be distinguished from
mere fallacy or suggestion. Sometimes the suggestibility of children's memories pre-
vents the children from knowing the truth themselves. Stephen J. Ceci, Some Over-
arching Issues in the Children's Suggestibility Debate, in Recollections, supra note 77,
at 7-9.
88. Karen Saywitz et al., Children's Memory for a Genital Examination: Implica-
tions for Child Sexual Abuse Cases, discussed in Goodman & Clarke-Stewart, supra
note 77, at 98-99.
89. Id at 98.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 99.
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contact were considered, children failed to disclose it 64% of the time,
whereas the chance of obtaining a false report of genital/anal touching
was only 1%."I 3
Although this study indicates that the risk of suggestion is minimal,
any risk poses a dilemma for child abuse professionals. Kee MacFar-
lane, a social worker who is widely considered to be an expert on child
molestation,94 writes:
In the best of all possible worlds, it would be advisable not to ask
children leading questions, in order to avoid the concern that chil-
dren are responding to suggestions that certain things occurred or
that they are being compliant and acquiescent to an adult authority
figure. But, in the best of all possible worlds, children are not sexu-
ally assaulted in secrecy, and then bribed, threatened, or intimidated
not to talk about it. In the real world, where such things do happen,
leading questions may sometimes be necessary ....
As a consequence, those who take on the task of evaluating al-
leged child victims must also be prepared to become the objects of
attack when cases enter the legal system and their conclusions and
techniques are challenged .... However, for those who can with-
stand the process in the interest of insuring that the voices of sexu-
ally abused children are heard, the risks and the battles are part of
the job.95
Thus, interviewers are caught between the danger of failing to un-
cover actual cases of molestation and the consequences of leading
children to report crimes that did not occur. The latter choice may
cause these children to believe that they have been victimized, and
thus experience all of the associated traumas.96 In addition, these mis-
statements may lead not only to false accusations, but also to convic-
tions of innocent people.
B. Children's Testimony and the Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment provides in relevant part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."97 This provision, commonly referred
to as the Confrontation Clause, entitles criminal defendants to cross-
examine witnesses and be present when witnesses testify against
93. Id.
94. Hechler, supra note 2, at 154.
95. MacFarlane et al., supra note 1, at 87, 99-100.
96. Adult survivors of child sexual abuse often suffer long-term trauma as a result
of the molestation. They are likely to be anxious, depressed, self-deprecating, or ad-
dicted to alcohol or drugs. Finklehor, supra note 15, at 188-99; Myers, supra note 87,
§ 4.2, at 220-24.
97. U.S. Const. amend. VI. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment makes the Confrontation Clause binding on the states. Pointer v. Texas, 380
U.S. 400, 405 (1965).
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them.98 The Supreme Court has stated that the guarantee is based on
"something deep in human nature that regards face-to-face confronta-
tion between accused and accuser as 'essential to a fair trial in a crimi-
nal prosecution.' "99
This guarantee is an integral part of the hearsay rules,' °° which are
designed to function "as an adjunct to the confrontation right." '
Both the hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are devised to
ensure the veracity of the testimony presented. 0 2 In child sexual
abuse prosecutions, however, requiring the child complainant to con-
front the defendant may inhibit the child's truthful testimony.' °3
Moreover, the most accurate allegations may be contained in the ear-
liest reports,"° the admission of which is dependent upon the availa-
bility of exceptions to the hearsay rule. Strict application of the
confrontation requirement and hearsay prohibitions may therefore
impede the fact-finding process in these prosecutions.
1. Children's In-Court Testimony
The Supreme Court first considered this issue in Coy v. Iowa.0 5 In
Coy, the defendant challenged the constitutionality of a statutory pro-
cedure that allowed child complainants to testify from behind a
98. Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence Under the Rules
421-22 (2d ed. 1993).
99. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017 (1988) (quoting Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S.
400, 404 (1965)).
100. Although child sexual abuse cases are usually brought in state court, this Note
will use the Federal Rules of Evidence as a model. Most states' evidentiary rules are
very similar to the Federal Rules. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 98, at 3. Rule
801 defines hearsay as an out-of-court statement "offered ... to prove the truth of the
matter asserted." Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Generally, hearsay is not admissible. Fed. R.
Evid. 802. Exceptions are set forth in Rules 801(d), 803, and 804.
101. Advisory Committee's Introductory Note to Article VIII: The Hearsay Prob-
lem, reprinted in Federal Rules of Evidence with Advisory Committee Notes and Leg-
islative History 174 (Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick eds., 1993).
102. Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 97, at 115-18 (identifying theories underly-
ing hearsay rules); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (stating that the pri-
mary purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the veracity of evidence).
103. Timothy J. McCarvill & James M. Steinberg, Note, Have We Gone Far
Enough? Children Who Are Sexually Abused and the Judicial and Legislative Means
of Prosecuting the Abuser, 8 St. John's J. Legal Comment. 339, 343 (1992); Maria H.
Bainor, Note, The Constitutionality of te Use of Two-Way Closed Circuit Television to
Take Testimony of Child Victims of Sex Crimes, 53 Fordham L Rev. 995, 997-99
(1985); Serketich, supra note 25, at 222-23; supra note 82 and accompanying text.
104. See Edward Cone & Lisa Scheer, The Demons of Edenton, Elle, Nov. 1993, at
139, 140 (quoting F.B.I. Supervisory Special Agent Kenneth Lanning, America's "top
cop" on child molestation, as saying "I happen to believe that in most of these cases,
there's a core of truth and usually that's what comes out in the early disclosures").
The earliest reports may be the most accurate because subsequent interviews some-
times affect the child's memory. See supra notes 82-95 and accompanying text. How-
ever, the interviewing process may enable the child to express more fully what
happened. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
105. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). For a thorough discussion of this case, see Ellen For-
man, To Keep the Balance True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 Hastings L.J. 437 (1989).
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screen.'1 6 Although the screen completely blocked the complainant's
view of the defendant, the defendant was able to "dimly perceive" the
witness.107
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia devoted most of the Coy
opinion to a history of the Confrontation Clause, citing the Bible,
Shakespeare and President Eisenhower to "illustrate... both the an-
tiquity and the currency of the human feeling that a criminal trial is
not just unless one can confront his accusers."'1 8 Asserting that con-
frontation is essential to a fair trial, the majority viewed any trauma
suffered by the victim as a necessary cost of guaranteeing a defend-
ant's constitutional rights. 0 9
The Court concluded that the barrier violated the defendant's right
to confront his accuser.110 The majority held that although past cases
had compromised those rights "reasonably implicit""' in the Con-
frontation Clause, the right at issue in Coy-to face one's accuser-
was the "irreducible literal meaning""' 2 of the Clause. The Court ac-
knowledged that exceptions to this right also may exist, but it declined
to identify them, and stated that "[w]hatever they may be, they would
surely be allowed only when necessary to further an important public
policy.""' 3 Concurring, Justice O'Connor wrote that "protection of
child witnesses is ... just such a policy,""' 4 thereby paving the way for
her majority opinion in Maryland v. Craig."'
Two years later, in Craig and Idaho v. Wright,"6 the Court reconsid-
ered the issue of confrontation in child sexual abuse prosecutions,
weighing the defendant's right to confront his accuser against the
state's interest in protecting child witnesses. In Craig, the Court again
stated that face-to-face confrontation is not an indispensable requisite
of the Confrontation Clause." 7 Writing for the majority, Justice
O'Connor asserted that protecting the child witness in abuse cases is a
sufficiently important state interest to counter the defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights."' The Court held that a child witness may testify
106. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1014-15.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1018 n.2.
109. Id. at 1020.
110. Id. at 1020-22.
111. Id. at 1020. The Court enumerated these rights as "the right to cross-examine,
the right to exclude out-of-court statements, and the asserted right to face-to-face
confrontation at some point in the proceedings other than the trial Itself." Id. (cita-
tions omitted).
112. Id. at 1021.
113. Id. (citations omitted).
114. Id. at 1025 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
115. 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
116. 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
117. Craig, 497 U.S. at 847.
118. Id. at 853. The Court supported this proposition by citing statutes enacted by
the majority of states allowing the use of various protective procedures to procure the
testimony of abused children. Id. at 853-54 nn. 2-3. Justice Scalia dissented in Craig,
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without face-to-face confrontation if the state makes an adequate,
case-specific showing that the defendant's presence would traumatize
the witness.119
Specifically, the Craig Court allowed the child to testify via one-way
closed-circuit television, a procedure now authorized in most states.120
These statutes provide that, following a finding by the trial court of
potential trauma to the victim, in accordance with Craig, the child wit-
ness may testify from a separate room."' Typically, both the prosecu-
tor and defense counsel accompany the witness and conduct their
examinations in person.122 The direct and cross-examinations are in-
stantaneously transmitted into the courtroom.'23 Closed-circuit televi-
sion thereby permits the defendant, judge and jury to see and hear the
witness, and does not compromise defense counsel's ability to cross-
examine. The procedure protects the child witness from the trauma of
writing that "[s]eldom has this Court failed so conspicuously to sustain a categorical
guarantee of the Constitution against the tide of prevailing current opinion." Id. at
860 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
119. Id. at 855-56. The Court failed to specify what constitutes trauma, other than
to say that the child's emotional distress must be more than "'mere nervousness or
excitement or some reluctance to testify.'" Id. at 856 (quoting Wildermuth v. State,
530 A.2d 275, 289 (Md. 1987)). The Court did state that "the Maryland statute, which
requires... 'serious emotional distress such that the child cannot reasonably commu-
nicate,' clearly suffices to meet constitutional standards." Id. (citation omitted).
120. Prior to the Craig decision, 26 states statutorily authorized the use of closed
circuit television in child abuse prosecutions. See Ala. Code § 15-25-3 (Supp. 1989);
Alaska Stat. § 12.45.046 (Supp. 1989); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4253 (1989); Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 54-86g (West 1989); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 92.54 (1989); Ga. Code Ann.
§ 17-8-55 (Supp. 1989); Haw. R. Evid. 616 (1985); Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 106A-3
(1987); Ind. Code § 35-37-4-8 (1988); Iowa Code § 910A.14 (Supp. 1990); Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 38-1558 (1986); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 421.350(1), (3) (Baldwin Supp. 1989);
La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:283 (West Supp. 1990); Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. Code Ann. § 9-
102 (1989); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 278, § 16D (Vest Supp. 1990); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 595.02(4) (1988); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-405 (Supp. 1989); NJ. Stat. Ann.
§ 2A:84A-32.4 (West Supp. 1989); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 753(B) (West Supp.
1988); Or. Rev. Stat. § 40.460(24) (1989); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5982,5985 (1988);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-13.2 (Supp. 1989); Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.071, § 3
(West Supp. 1990); Utah R. Crim. Proc. 15.5 (1990); Vt. R. Evid. 807(d) (Supp. 1989);
Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-67.9 (Michie 1988). Since Craig, seven states have adopted
similar statutes. See Cal. Pen. Code § 1347 (West Supp. 1994); Idaho Code § 19-
3024A (Supp. 1994); Iowa Code § 910A.14 (1994 Supp.); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law
§§ 65.00-65.30 (McKinney 1992); 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 723; Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2907.41 (Baldwin 1993); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.44.150 ( West Supp. 1994).
121. E.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1347(b) (West Supp. 1994); Haw. R. Evid. 616(d);
Idaho Code § 19-3024A(2) (Supp. 1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.41(C) (Ander-
son 1993); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-67.9 (Michie 1988).
122. E.g., Haw. R. Evid. 616(d); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.41(C) (Anderson
1993); Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-67.9(C) (Michie 1988). Contra Cal. Penal Code
§ 1347(b) (West Supp. 1994) (allowing child to testify "out of the presence of the
judge, jury, defendant, and attorneys"); Idaho Code § 19-3024A(2) (Supp. 1994)
(same).
123. E.g., Cal. Penal Code § 1347(b) (West Supp. 1994); Idaho Code § 19-3024A(2)
(Supp. 1994); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.41(C) (Anderson 1993); Va. Code Ann.
§ 18.2-67.9(D) (Michie 1988).
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the defendant's presence and, incidentally, of the courtroom atmos-
phere. The Supreme Court's approval of the use of closed-circuit tele-
vision removed some of the obstacles that may prevent children from
testifying accurately. Wright, however, decided on the same day as
Craig, placed a new obstacle in the prosecutor's path.
2. Introduction of Hearsay Statements
Unlike Coy and Craig, which focused on the child accuser's testi-
mony at trial, Wright addressed the question of whether the child's
prior statements could properly be introduced under an exception to
the hearsay rules without violating the Confrontation Clause. 124 The
Wright Court elaborated upon an earlier holding in Ohio v. Roberts12 5
that established a two-pronged test for determining whether use of a
hearsay statement violated the Confrontation Clause. 6 Under the
Roberts test, the declarant must be "unavailable, 12 7 and the state-
ment must either be within a "firmly-rooted" hearsay exception or
have "adequate indicia of reliability."' 28 In Wright, the Court adhered
to the traditional view that these indicia include "particularized guar-
124. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 815-16 (1990).
125. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
126. Id. at 65-66.
127. Id. at 65. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(a) defines unavailability:
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the declarant-
(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from
testifying concerning the subject matter of the declarant's statement; or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the de-
clarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of the declarant's
statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has
been unable to procure the declarant's attendance (or in the case of a hear-
say exception under subdivision (b)(2), (3), or (4), the declarant's attendance
or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption, refusal, claim of
lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdo-
ing of the proponent of a statement for the purpose of preventing the wit-
ness from attending or testifying.
Fed. R. Evid. 804(a).
In a line of cases following Roberts, the Court held that the requirement of unavail-
ability did not apply to out-of-court statements that fell within certain "firmly-rooted"
hearsay exceptions. See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 112 S.Ct. 736, 743-44 (1992) (holding
that the government need not show the declarant to be unavailable when introducing
statements under either the "spontaneous declaration" or "medical treatment" excep-
tion); Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183-84 (1987) (holding that the gov-
ernment need not show the declarant to be unavailable when introducing statements
under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule); United States v. Inadi, 475
U.S. 387, 399-400 (1986) (same). In Wright, the defense stipulated that the witness
was unavailable, and the Court therefore found it unnecessary to address whether
unavailability was constitutionally required. Wright, 497 U.S. at 815-16.
128. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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antees of trustworthiness"' 9 derived from the "totality of circum-
stances."'130 The Court departed from tradition, however, by ruling
that the circumstances to be examined were limited to those surround-
ing the making of the statement.1 31 Corroborating evidence could not
be considered. 13
The Wright decision frustrates the prosecution of child molestation
cases. While the availability of corroborative evidence is rare,133 it can
be an invaluable tool in determining the trustworthiness of hearsay
statements. Many of the child's statements are made during profes-
sional interviews, the accuracy of which is extremely difficult to as-
sess.134 The Wright Court specifically declined to adopt a mechanical
test for determining proper interview procedures for eliciting accurate
statements. 35 In light of Wright, prosecutors and courts must sift
through a large, unfamiliar body of research on the suggestibility of
children's memories and then evaluate the procedures used to procure
the offered statement. The Wright decision therefore presents yet an-
other evidentiary hurdle in the criminal arena.
C. The Introduction of Expert Testimony Regarding
the Alleged Victim
Prosecutors often use expert witnesses to bolster the credibility of a
child complainant who is testifying in court. An expert witness may
be used in a number of ways, from explaining delays in reporting to
opining that the complainant is telling the truth.'36 This type of testi-
mony most often involves the identification of Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome ("CSAAS"). 37 Proponents of CSAAS
believe that the majority of child victims demonstrate similar symp-
129. Wright, 497 U.S. at 816 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66).
130. Id. at 819.
131. Id.
132. Id. The Court reasoned that physical evidence was inadmissible for the pur-
pose of determining trustworthiness because it "sheds no light on the reliability of the
child's allegations regarding the identity of the abuser." Id. at 824. One author ap-
propriately questions whether this reasoning would apply to medical evidence of a
sexually transmitted disease. Nancy Schleifer, Might Versus Fright: The Confronta-
tion Clause and the Search for "Truth" in the Child Abuse Family Court Case, 16 Nova
L. Rev. 783, 794 (1992).
133. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
135. Wright, 497 U.S. at 819.
136. Rebecca J. Roe, Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, in National
Conference, supra note 23, at 289; McCord, supra note 17, at 41-53; Myers, supra note
17, at 18-20.
137. CSAAS was introduced by Dr. Roland C. Summit in 1983, see Summit, supra
note 76, and may also be referred to as "Child Sexual Abuse Syndrome." Neither of
these are recognized by the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders.
Some expert witnesses, therefore, refrain from defining a syndrome, but still identify
"common characteristics" of sexually abused children. Even this type of testimony is
hotly contested. See infra note 148 and accompanying text; see also Kee MacFarlane,
Sexual Abuse of Children, in The Victimization of Women 81, 97 (J. Chapman & M.
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toms, the most common of which include nightmares, loss of appetite,
age-inappropriate sexual knowledge, delay in reporting abuse and re-
cantation.138 Other symptoms are ambiguous, and seem to have little
probative value. For example, the child may either regress or be
"pseudo-mature," withdraw or act out.139
The most common use of this expert testimony is to explain weak-
nesses in the child's accusations. 140 Specifically, the prosecutor may
introduce testimony regarding CSAAS to rehabilitate the impeached
credibility of a child witness. For example, where reporting is delayed,
defense attorneys often argue that a truly victimized child would have
come forward immediately-that delayed reporting indicates that the
allegation is fabricated.' 4' An expert witness may rebut these asser-
tions by testifying that fear and confusion cause many children to de-
lay, or even forgo, reporting sexual abuse. 42 The expert also may
address other allegedly unusual behavior by the child witness, such as
inconsistencies and recantation. 43 The majority of courts have up-
held the admissibility of expert testimony for rehabilitative
purposes. 144
A second, and more controversial, use of an expert witness is to
introduce evidence of CSAAS to prove that the abuse actually oc-
curred. Based upon the identification of CSAAS symptoms exhibited
by the child complainant, the expert witness typically will conclude
that the child has been sexually abused. 145 Courts are divided as to
the admissibility of this testimony. Many courts have reversed convic-
tions where this evidence was admitted.146 These decisions conclude
Gates eds., 1978) ("Generalizations about the effects of any kind of interpersonal
crisis often do a disservice to all individuals involved.").
138. John E.B. Myers, The Child Witness: Techniques for Direct Examination,
Cross-Examination, and Impeachment, 18 Pac. L.J. 801, 833-34 (1987); Summit, supra
note 76, at 177-88.
139. Myers, supra note 138, at 833.
140. Myers, supra note 137, at 841-48.
141. McCord, supra note 17, at 58-59.
142. McCord, supra note 17, at 59; Myers, supra note 137, at 826.
143. Myers, supra note 137, at 841-48.
144. See People v. Beckley, 456 N.W.2d 391, 407 (Mich. 1990); State v. J.Q., 617
A.2d 1196, 1209 (N.J. 1993); State v. Middleton, 657 P.2d 1215, 1220 (Or. 1983); State
v. Pettit, 675 P.2d 183, 185 (Or. Ct. App. 1984); Sapien v. State, 705 S.W.2d 214, 216-
17 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); State v. Haseltine, 352 N.W.2d 673, 676 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984).
But see Commonwealth v. Dunkle, 602 A.2d 830, 837 (Pa. 1992) ("Not only is there
no need for testimony about the reasons children may not come forward, but permit-
ting it would infringe upon the jury's right to determine credibility.").
145. Myers, supra note 138, at 836-41.
146. See Hellstrom v. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d 612, 613 (Ky. 1992); State v.
Miller, 377 N.W.2d 506, 508 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Knupp, 579 N.Y.S.2d
801, 802 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); People v. Fogarty, 446 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1982); Black v. State, 634 S.W.2d 356, 357 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982). Lucy Berliner, a
social worker at the Sexual Abuse Center in Seattle and supervisor of the National
Institute of Mental Health's research on the impact of sexual abuse on children, ad-
dressed this issue at the National Symposium on Child Molestation: "I caution you
[Vol. 63
CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE
that this type of testimony goes to the ultimate issue in the case, effec-
tively usurping the jury's role as trier of fact. Other courts have al-
lowed this testimony on the grounds that the expert opinion,
"although embracing an ultimate issue, represents both the peculiar
expertise and consummate purpose of an expert's analysis." '47
The problems with this second use of expert testimony arise from
the basis for the expert's conclusion, rather than the role of the jury.
There are three major problems with this type of testimony. First,
children may perceive that they have been abused without actually
having been abused as defined by law.'" Second, the assertion that a
child has been abused is not evidence that the child was abused on a
particular date by a particular defendant. Third, while it is possible
that all children who are sexually abused exhibit similar symptoms, 49
it does not logically follow that all children exhibiting these symptoms
have been sexually abused. These symptoms may result from other
causes as well.150 Attempts to show otherwise indicate the confusion
with which attorneys and courts regard evidentiary issues in these
prosecutions.':"
D. The Apparent Failure of Traditional Prosecution Techniques
It is increasingly clear that traditional prosecutorial techniques are
insufficient in child sexual abuse cases. According to the chief of one
sexual battery unit, "Traditional methods of prosecution are essen-
about using expert witnesses. We got a little carried away .... The prosecutors asked
a lot of questions that they were pretty excited about being able to ask, and as a
result, we've had cases overturned on appeal." Symposium, supra note 65, at 149.
147. Townsend v. State, 734 P.2d 705, 708 (Nev. 1987); see also Glendening v. State,
536 So. 2d 212, 220 (Fla. 1988) ("A qualified expert may express an opinion as to
whether a child has been the victim of sexual abuse."); State v. Kim 645 P.2d 1330,
1338 (Haw. 1982) ("[S]uch testimony insofar as it may, upon occasion, serve the sim-
ple purpose of clarifying and consolidating the gist of the expert's testimony .... );
State v. Myers 359 N.W.2d 604, 611-12 (Minn. 1984) (approving such testimony where
defendant challenged witness's truthfulness); State v. Timperio, 528 N.E.2d 594, 597
(Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (allowing such testimony because "[t]he nature... of the sexual
abuse of children places lay jurors at a disadvantage").
148. Gary B. Melton & Susan Limber, Psychologists' Involvement in Cases of Child
Maltreatment: Limits of Role and Experience, 44 Am. Psych. 1225, 1229 (1989).
149. The assertion that all children who are sexually abused exhibit similar symp-
toms is widely debated. Josephine A. Bulkley, The Prosecution's Use of Social Sci-
ence Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases: National Trends and
Recommendations, 1 J. Child Sexual Abuse 73, 82 (1992); John E.B. Myers et al.,
Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Litigation, 68 Neb. L. Rev. 1, 74-78 (1989).
150. Alvin A. Rosenfeld, The Clinical Management of Incest and Sexual Abuse of
Children, 22 Trauma 2, 3 (1980).
151. The Honorable Phylis Skloot Bamberger has written, "From the perspective of
a judge, the single most difficult criminal case to try is a child sex abuse case. It must
be equally so for the attorneys." Phylis S. Bamberger & Richard N. Altman, Some
Special Concerns in the Trial of Child Sexual Abuse Cases, N.Y. St. B.J., June 1992, at
18, 18.
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tially useless in dealing with child victims of sexual assault."1 52  De-
spite good intentions, most prosecutors and judges lack the
information and resources necessary to face the particular challenges
posed by these cases. For example, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
reversed a sexual assault conviction by overturning a trial court's deci-
sion to admit testimony from the child victim's doctor.153 The doctor
testified as to statements made by the child during a medical examina-
tion.15 4 Such testimony generally is admissible under the medical ex-
amination exception to the hearsay rule.155 The court nevertheless
stated, "If the child could tell the story to the doctor, she could have
told it on the witness stand to the jury.'1 56 The court's insensitivity to
the child witness's situation reflects attitudes pervasive throughout the
legal community, the majority of which lacks an understanding of the
peculiar evidentiary nature of these cases.
A recent New Jersey case, State v. Michaels,'57 provides a more dra-
matic illustration of the problems encountered in these prosecutions.
The defendant, Margaret Kelly Michaels, was a nursery school
teacher. 58 While a pediatrician took a former student's temperature
rectally, the child stated, "That's what my teacher does to me at
school."' 59 When asked to which teacher he was referring, the boy
identified Michaels. 16° His mother later discovered that no rectal
152. Christopher Rundle, A Discussion of Evidentiary and Procedural Problems
and Methods for Improving Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, and Special Approaches
with Pre-School Age Victims, in National Conference, supra note 23, at 145, 147.
153. State v. Paster, 524 A.2d 587, 590-91 (R.I. 1987).
154. Id.
155. Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). In 1992, the Supreme Court indirectly approved the ad-
missibility of a statement regarding the identity of the abuser under this exception.
White v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 736, 744 (1992). The identity of the perpetrator was specif-
ically held to be "reasonably pertinent" to treatment in United States v. Iron Shell,
633 F.2d 77, 83 (8th Cir. 1980). For a discussion of the role of this exception in child
sex abuse cases, see generally Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statements
for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 257 (1989).
156. Paster, 524 A.2d at 591. This case is discussed in Dziech & Schudson, supra
note 16, who write:
While the Rhode Island decision is astounding in its lack of understanding of
both children and law, the attitudes it reflects are not peculiar to that case or
state. The prosecutor and judge in the Greenbrook [Rhode Island] case
were not evil, but all too typical. In courtrooms throughout America, the
discrepancy between education and ignorance, between sensitive theory and
insensitive practice, between pure legal tradition and perverse legal imple-
mentation, revictimizes children.
Id. at 162.
157. 625 A.2d 489 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
158. Id. at 494. Michaels resigned more than one year before the investigation be-
gan. Id. at 495.
159. David G. Savage, Abuser or Abused? Ruling Triggers Question Over Who's
Real Victim in N.J. Molestation Case, L.A. Times, Apr. 20, 1993, at El. The defense
argued that the boy's comment referred to the rubbing of his back and not anal pene-
tration. Michaels, 625 A.2d at 495.
160. Michaels, 625 A.2d at 495.
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thermometers were used at the school, and the investigation began.16 1
Almost three years later, a jury convicted Michaels of 115 counts of
sexual abuse involving twenty students.'6 Michaels was incarcerated
for five years before the appellate court reversed all convictions and
remanded to the law division for a new trial.' 63
The appellate court reversed on three grounds. First, the trial court
admitted the use of expert testimony as substantive evidence of
abuse.164 Specifically, the state's expert testified as to the symptoms
of CSAAS, and then gave her opinion as to whether the children's
behavior was consistent with their allegations.1 65 While some states
have allowed this use of expert testimony,' 66 New Jersey has held that
it is only admissible for rehabilitative purposes. 167 Although New
Jersey's holding on this issue came several years after the Michaels
trial, the appellate court found that admission of the testimony none-
theless constituted reversible error.16
Second, the court held that the trial judge inappropriately
"cross[ed] the line between an impartial judge and the prosecu-
tion. 1169 The children's testimony was televised to the jury from
chambers, where the judge played with the children, exchanged whis-
pers with them, and held them on his lap.1 70 He often took charge of
the questioning, thereby turning the State's witnesses into his own.' 7 1
While recognizing that the judge "clearly felt he was doing the right
thing by assisting in the search for the 'truth,' ""7 the appellate court
condemned these actions as sacrificing the required impartiality. 73
Finally, the appellate court found that pretrial interviews had
tainted the children's testimony. 74 The interviewers continually re-
ferred to the defendant as "bad," and encouraged the children to help
the police "bust[ ] this case wide open."' 75 They praised the children
161. Savage, supra note 159, at El.
162. Michaels, 625 A.2d at 492.
163. Id. at 493, 524.
164. Id. at 499-501.
165. Id at 499. The expert concluded that all of the children except one had been
molested. Id
166. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
167. State v. J.Q., 617 A.2d 1196, 1210 (NJ. 1993).
168. Michaels, 625 A.2d at 502. The Michaels court stated that the expert's testi-
mony "constituted nothing less than substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt ....
This constituted error because syndrome evidence is not probative of sexual abuse.
The syndrome assumes the presence of sexual abuse and only seeks to explain the
child's reaction to it." Id at 499 (citation omitted).
169. Id. at 508.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 510-19. The court's statement that the children's memories may have
been irreparably altered leads one to wonder how a retrial could possibly be
conducted.
175. Id. at 511.
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for using sexual language, and threatened disclosure of those that
were uncooperative.' 76 Some told the children what others had said
prior to interviewing them. 77 The State therefore conceded that
many of the interviews included suggestive questioning.178
The length of the appellate court's opinion indicates the breadth of
issues raised in these cases. 179 Acknowledging that the amount of
literature on the topic of interviewing alone is "overwhelming," ' the
court attempted to summarize the research in five pages and thus re-
lied heavily on a few sources.' 8' The Michaels opinion vividly demon-
strates the complex nature of these prosecutions.
An even more striking illustration of the problems inherent in these
cases comes from the highly publicized McMartin Preschool trials in
California. The first of the McMartin prosecutions spanned more than
six years and cost taxpayers over thirteen million dollars, making it
the longest and costliest criminal case in American history.18 2
The investigation began in August of 1983, when a woman reported
that Raymond Buckey, a staff member at the reputable Virginia Mc-
Martin Preschool, had sodomized her two-and-a-half-year-old son.8 3
Medical examinations yielded contradictory findings.' 8 4 Searches of
the preschool and the Buckey home were fruitless. 85 Police neverthe-
less arrested Buckey on September 7, 1983 and then released him the
same day due to insufficient evidence.' 6
On September 8, 1983, the Manhattan Beach, California police de-
partment sent questionnaires to 200 families of former and current
McMartin preschoolers.' s The questionnaires, later deemed "the in-
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 510-11.
179. The opinion spanned 35 pages in the Atlantic Reporter, 625 A.2d 489 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993), and 64 pages in the state reporter, 264 N.J. Super. 579
(1993).
180. Michaels, 625 A.2d at 511.
181. Id. at 511-16. For example, the court cited Diana Younts, Note, Evaluating and
Admitting Expert Opinion Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 41 Duke
L.J. 691 (1991), 14 times on these pages.
182. Jay Mathews, Seven Years and $13.2 Million Dollars Later, Child Molestation
Case Nears End, Wash. Post, July 3, 1990, at A16.
183. Jean Montoya, Something Not So Funny Happened on the Way to Conviction:
The Pretrial Interrogation of Child Witnesses, 35 Ariz. L. Rev. 927, 930 (1993). The
reporting parent, Judy Johnson, later filed similar charges against several others, in-
cluding her estranged husband. Ms. Johnson, who later died from alcohol-induced
liver damage, even claimed that her dog had been sodomized. Id. at 931.
184. Norma Meyer & Paul Pringle, Critics Say Runaway McMartin Case Has In-
dicted Justice System, San Diego Union, Jan. 19, 1990, at A13.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Cynthia Gorney, A Textbook Example of What Not to Do: Complex, Costly
Child Molestation Prosecution Overwhelmed Criminal Justice System, Wash. Post, Jan.
19, 1990, at A6.
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vestigators' first major mistake,"'" identified Buckey as a potential
child molester and asked parents to question their children about vari-
ous sexual acts that may have occurred at the school. 18 9 Although
none of the completed surveys contained allegations of abuse, the Dis-
trict Attorney's office encouraged parents to probe further." ° Prose-
cutors advised parents to bring their children to a Los Angeles child
sexual abuse clinic, where videotaped interviews of 400 children were
eventually conducted.' 9' The three interviewers concluded that 369
children had been molested by seven McMartin staff members. 9
Following indictment and an eighteen month preliminary hearing,
Municipal Judge Aviva K. Bobb ordered all seven to stand trial on 135
of more than 300 charged counts of sexual abuse.193 Prosecutors ulti-
mately dropped charges against five of the defendants, leaving only
Raymond Buckey and his mother, Peggy McMartin Buckey, to be
tried.194 Thirty-three months, 124 witnesses, 974 exhibits and almost
64,000 pages of transcript later, the Buckeys were acquitted on fifty-
two counts of abuse. 195 The jury deadlocked on the remaining thir-
teen, all of which were against Raymond Buckey. 96 Two new prose-
cutors retried Buckey on eight counts involving only three children."9
Another jury deadlocked on these charges, and the judge declared a
mistrial.198
On July 28, 1990, the McMartin case ended without a single convic-
tion, despite the fact that seven of the jurors believed the children had
been molested "in some sense, by someone."' 99 An assistant district
attorney acknowledged that it was "quite possible that there are some
people in this case who were wrongfully accused."20 ° The enormous
resources expended and the inconclusive resolution led supporters of
188. Id.
189. Meyer & Pringle, supra note 184, at A13; see also Paul Eberle & Shirley Eb-
erle, The Abuse of Innocence: The McMartin Preschool Trial 18-19 (1993) (reproduc-
ing the text of the questionnaire).
190. Meyer & Pringle, supra note 184, at A13.
191. Id
192. Id. Although there was initially an eighth suspect, Robert Hamill Winkler, he
died before charges were brought. Mr. Winkler was awaiting trial on unrelated mo-
lestation charges at the time of his death. Lois Timnick, Uncharged McMartin Case
Suspect Found Dead, L.A. Times, Nov. 14, 1985, § 2, at 2.
193. Lois Timnick, All 7 McMartin Defendants Are Ordered to Stand Trial, LA.
Times, Jan. 10, 1986, § 1, at 10, 28.
194. Katherine MacDonald, 5 of 7 Won't Stand Trial in McMartin Molestation Case,
Wash. Post, Jan. 18, 1986, at A2. The District Attorney's Office reportedly cited "in-
credibly weak evidence" as the basis for this decision. 2 Cities Ask State to Try All 7
Original McMartin Defendants, L.A. Times, Feb. 13, 1986, § 9, at 2.
195. Dziech & Schudson, supra note 16, at 182-83.
196. Mathews, supra note 182, at A16.
197. Id
198. McMartin Jury Deadlocks: Buckey Won't Be Retried, L.A. Times, July 29,
1990, at Al.
199. Dziech & Schudson, supra note 16, at 184.
200. Mathews, supra note 182, at A16.
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both sides to characterize the McMartin case as a gross miscarriage of
justice.20'
The Michaels and McMartin cases demonstrate the problems that
occur at all levels of the criminal process, from investigation to trial.
These problems cannot merely be attributed to unfamiliarity with
legal precedent or child psychology. The difficulties encountered are
not surmountable solely through the implementation of evidentiary
exceptions; they must be anticipated and avoided at every level of in-
vestigation and adjudication.
III. AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH
Less than one-half of the reported child sexual abuse cases are re-
ferred to the criminal justice system. Contrary to common belief,
the child and family may benefit from involvement in the criminal
justice system. This can only be accomplished with a sensitive and
patient approach to the child and the child's family. It cannot be
accomplished without the involvement of a therapist and an advo-
cate from the criminal justice system.2°
Most child interest advocates agree that cooperation among the var-
ious disciplines involved in child sexual abuse investigations is a neces-
sary step in the search for justice.2 °3 A prompt, fair disposition cannot
be reached as long as the professionals involved fail to communicate
with each other. Traditionally, these efforts were relegated to the civil
arena.204 The advances in civil court proceedings were neither re-
flected adequately in nor coordinated with their criminal counter-
part.20 5 This disparity further discouraged criminal prosecution of
these cases.
Recognizing this problem, many jurisdictions have implemented a
"team approach" to criminal prosecution of child molestation. 0 6
Although the precise nature of these efforts varies from county to
county, all focus on protecting the child from revictimization by both
the abuser and the criminal system, and many have been successful in
201. See Lois Timnick, McMartin Inquiry Attacked as Inept, L.A. Times, June 16,
1985, § 2, at 1 ("[D]efense attorneys and parents of many of the alleged victims found
themselves in rare agreement on one point: that the investigation and prosecution of
the case had been botched from the beginning.").
202. Robert E. Cramer, Jr., The District Attorney as a Mobilizer in a Community
Approach to Child Sexual Abuse, 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 209, 214 (1985).
203. Furniss, supra note 53, at 101-08; Hechler, supra note 2, at 221-24; MacFarlane
et al., supra note 1, at 318, 323; President's Report, supra note 56, at 83-88.
204. See Davidson et al., supra note 29, at 141-46. See generally Family Law: An
Interdisciplinary Perspective (Howard H. Irving ed., 1981) (advocating cooperation
between law and the behavioral sciences in the family law field).
205. See Jeffrey E. Froelich, Family Crisis Intervention, 29 Juv. & Fam. Ct. J. 3, 3-7
(1978).
206. ABA Recommendations, supra note 44, at 7; National Network of Children's
Advocacy Centers, National Listing of Children's Advocacy Centers, Sept. 1994 [here-
inafter National Listing] (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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this regard.20 7 However, they also have been attacked by defendants'
rights advocates as tipping the criminal justice scales in favor of the
alleged victim.2"8 The ways in which these efforts benefit defendants
as well as victims have not previously been explored.
A. Madison County, Alabama: A Model
The first, and most widely acclaimed, of these efforts was instituted
by Robert E. Cramer, Jr. in Madison County, Alabama.2"9 Cramer,
previously assigned to Juvenile Court, was elected District Attorney in
1981, when reports of child molestation in his county, and around the
nation, were on the rise.21 0 Initially, Cramer scheduled meetings with
protective service agency workers to review the cases.211 As the scope
of the problem became apparent, Cramer increased the frequency of
these meetings, and invited law enforcement personnel and family
therapists to attend.212 Soon meetings were held biweekly instead of
monthly, and the different disciplines began to consult each other at
earlier stages of the investigation.213 Cramer describes the early
developments:
Team review strengthened relations between the police detectives
and the protective service social workers. The social workers and
the law enforcement detectives jointly investigated and reported on
all child sexual abuse cases. They performed the initial interview
together and later decided whether to confront the alleged offender.
We saw a dramatic turnaround in the attitude of both the law en-
forcement detectives and social workers. The team review experi-
ence helped each agency better understand the philosophy of the
other and prevented duplication of effort.214
By promoting teamwork among those involved, Cramer minimized
the child's discomfort while maximizing efficiency. In 1983, Cramer
led his community to form a child sexual abuse task force, the primary
purpose of which was to establish an even wider network of child
abuse and law enforcement professionals.2"' While all involved had
experience in the child sexual abuse arena, many had never met, and,
207. See infra notes 220-21 and accompanying text.
208. See infra note 236 and accompanying text.
209. For a detailed history of the Huntsville Center, see generally Robert E.
Cramer, Jr., A Community Approad to Child Sexual Abuse: The Role of the Office of
the District Attorney, 9 Response 10 (1986). Approximately 122 such centers-many
of them private, with no official ties to the justice system-have since been developed
nationwide. National Listing, supra note 206, at 1. Because almost all of these centers
are modeled after the Madison County approach, this Note uses Madison County as a
paradigm.
210. Cramer, supra note 202, at 210.
211. Id.
212. Id at 211.
213. Id.
214. Id at 211.
215. Id. at 212.
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therefore, neither trusted nor understood the other fields. 16
Although communication fostered cooperation, the agencies contin-
ued to function independently. 2
17
In 1984, the participants formed a multidisciplinary, child-focused
program called the Children's Advocacy Center (the "Center"). 18
The Center, located in a house in Huntsville, Alabama, serves as a
nexus for all molestation-related investigation and treatment. Each of
the agencies involved in these cases signed a written agreement to co-
ordinate their activities through the Center."' All reports of child
sexual abuse are referred to the Center, where liaisons from each or-
ganization confer with each other and their respective offices. 2 In-
stead of being shuffled from police departments to protective service
offices to emergency rooms to therapy to the prosecutor's office, vic-
tims of child sexual abuse visit only the Center.21 The Center pro-
vides a familiar, comforting environment-it becomes "the child's
'turf.' "222
The Center not only supplies a safe haven for child victims, but also
streamlines investigation. Duplicate interviews are avoided because
each agency is involved at every step of the process.2 3 Fewer inter-
views are conducted, and those that are conducted may be more effec-
tive. The team interviewer establishes trust by helping the child
explore the Center, and answering any questions the child might
216. Id.
217. Id. at 212-13.
218. Id. at 213.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 214. This idea of the Center as a second home has been adopted at
centers around the nation. See, e.g., Kathy Boccella, One Stop Center Eases the Pain
of Child Abuse, Phila. Inquirer, Mar. 13, 1992, at B1 (quoting child interest advocate's
description of interdisciplinary center: " 'It's less traumatizing for the child ... in an
environment that's not frightening.' "); Mike Folks, Easing the Trauma: "Home Safe"
Program Will Help Children Recount Stories of Abuse, Sun Sentinel, Aug. 11, 1993, at
3 (quoting founder of child-oriented center: " 'The concept is to bring the child to a
home-like setting.' "); Robert Kelly, Amy Center Has New Home, St. Louis Post-Dis-
patch, May 31, 1993, at 1 ("The atmosphere is important, because the Amy Center
exists to give children who are victims of sexual abuse a place where they can relax
and calmly tell their stories . . ").
223. Cramer, supra note 202, at 212-14. For example, the results of the first inter-
view are discussed at the biweekly team review session, at which all participating
agencies are represented. Id. at 214. If the interview was videotaped, the tape is
played at the meeting. Id. This minimization has been repeatedly identified as the
single most important feature of these types of centers. See, e.g., Folks, supra note
222, at 3 (quoting founder of child-oriented center: "'We want to get away from
multiple interviews.' "); Kelly, supra note 222, at 1 ("[T]he Amy Center was started
... [because] many victims of child sexual abuse 'were suffering from being ques-
tioned over and over and over again by authorities.' "); Stevenson Swanson, Glen
Ellyn Joins County's Child Sex-Abuse Program, Chi. Trib., Oct. 6, 1986, at 6 ("The
center is designed to reduce the number of interviews a child must undergo after an
incident of sexual abuse has been reported .... ").
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have.' 4 By forming a relationship with the child prior to the inter-
view, the Center increases the first interview's productivity. Children
are more likely to disclose abuse to persons with whom they are com-
fortable. 5 Unlike many adults, they will not trust someone simply
because they are told the stranger has professional status, or "is just
there to help."
The Center also seeks to facilitate children's in-court testimony.
The district attorney's victim-witness coordinator (the "Coordinator")
functions as the child complainant's advocate within the criminal jus-
tice system. 26 If the Center and the district attorney decide that a
case should go forward to prosecution, the Coordinator, who is al-
ready familiar with the child, eases the alleged victim into the criminal
process. 7 The Coordinator introduces the child to the assistant dis-
trict attorney handling the case, explains the criminal system and gives
a tour of the courthouse.'3 Introducing children to the system before
the trial process begins may alleviate some of the trauma experienced
by the child complainant 9 and thus assist their testimony.
The Madison County approach has been tremendously successful.
In addition to streamlining investigations, it has aided children by im-
proving the skills of the professionals involved.230 The success of the
interdisciplinary method is reflected in the number of cases accepted
for prosecution, which increased 500% in the first two years.23 1 Pro-
fessionals have concluded that prosecutions handled in this manner
can actually be therapeutic for the child complainant.3 2 The Center
has proven that the criminal justice system can benefit child victims of
sexual abuse.
B. The Rights of the Defendant
The Madison County Center and those modeled after it were
designed with one purpose: aiding child victims. 233 Although these
224. Cramer, supra note 202, at 214.
225. Kathleen C. Faller, Child Sexual Abuse: An Interdisciplinary Manual for Di-
agnosis, Case Management, and Treatment 156-57 (1988). The traditional method of
accommodation was to have a known and trusted person accompany the child to the
interview. Patricia A. Graves & Suzanne M. Sgroi, Law Enforcement and Child Sex-
ual Abuse, in Handbook of Clinical Intervention in Child Sexual Abuse 309, 320 (Su-
zanne M. Sgroi ed., 1982). The Center's approach, whereby the person conducting
the interview is known and trusted, is clearly preferable. The Center further enhances
the child's comfort by providing three special interviewing rooms, each geared toward
a specific age group. Cramer, supra note 202, at 213.
226. Cramer, supra note 202, at 214.
227. Id.
228. Id
229. See supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text.
230. Cramer, supra note 202, at 216.
231. Id.
232. Id
233. Cramer, supra note 202, at 213; Boccella, supra note 222, at B1; Swanson,
supra note 223, at 6.
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centers have been extremely effective in this regard, critics question
the appropriateness of this focus within the criminal system.234 Em-
phasizing that the defendant-oriented nature of our criminal system is
constitutionally mandated," 5 these individuals contend that centers
affiliated with criminal justice institutions place too much priority on
the victim's needs. Critics worry that the attempts to accommodate
children may sacrifice defendants' due process rights, thereby endan-
gering the falsely accused.23 6
The potential of these efforts to increase the efficacy of the adjudi-
catory process, thereby aiding innocent defendants as well as victims,
has not been explored. These centers prevent many of the previously
identified evidentiary difficulties" 7 from arising. The most obvious
benefit to victims-a more efficient interviewing process23S8-also
benefits defendants. Because law enforcement officials and child spe-
cialists are sharing information from the outset, the likelihood of im-
proper interviewing procedures is significantly decreased. Law
enforcement officials can advise child specialists regarding legal prece-
dent, and specialists can update law enforcement as to research on
suggestibility. Combining the resources of these disciplines diminishes
the chances of eliciting false reports. Had such a system been used in
the Michaels trial," 9 Ms. Michaels might have been spared five years
in prison.
Similarly, the erroneous use of scientific testimony240 might have
been avoided in the Michaels case if the prosecution had been coordi-
nated with an interagency organization. These organizations can
more easily follow case law developments than can the average assis-
tant district attorney, whose caseload is generally both heavy and di-
verse. Prosecutors thus have an invaluable resource in these centers.
While the decision that would ultimately lead to reversal on this issue
in Michaels had not yet come down at the time of trial,241 one can
speculate that a greater familiarity with the case law developments on
this issue might have cautioned the prosecutor against using this testi-
mony, because the majority of jurisdictions have disallowed this use of
syndrome evidence.242
234. See George, supra note 13, at Al.
235. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
236. Robert H. King, Jr., The Molested Child Witness and the Constitution: Should
the Bill of Rights Be Transformed into the Bill of Preferences?, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 49, 74-
76, 96-99 (1992); Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Note, Innocent Unitl Proven Guilty: Shallow
Words for the Falsely Accused in a Criminal Prosecution for Child Sexual Abuse, 12 U.
Bridgeport L. Rev. 175, 208 (1991).
237. See supra part II.A-C.
238. See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 157-80 and accompanying text.
240, See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text.
241. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
242. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, as noted above,24 3 testifying in court may be easier for
children participating in an interdisciplinary program. This develop-
ment is of particular importance to both prosecution and defendant.
Although Craig held that the defendant's Confrontation Clause rights
may not be violated by the use of closed-circuit television, the prose-
cution must show that the defendant's presence would "traumatize"
the victim to be permitted to use this method of testifying., The
vagueness of this standard troubles prosecutors, because the decisions
may easily be overturned on appeal. Thus, in-court testimony is pref-
erable to closed-circuit testimony. Furthermore, the Wright decision
makes it difficult to admit hearsay statements from prior interviews,
again increasing the importance of in-court testimony to the prosecu-
tor's case.2
45
Perhaps more significantly from a constitutional perspective, live
testimony benefits defendants as well. In-court testimony is clearly
the best method of safeguarding defendants' constitutional right to
confrontation, and of obtaining the accurate testimony the Confronta-
tion Clause was designed to facilitate. Infringement upon Confronta-
tion Clause rights, a constant risk in these prosecutions, 246 is therefore
less likely to occur in an interdisciplinary arena.
Finally, these centers have the general advantage of streamlining
the entire trial process by minimizing the amount of testimony intro-
duced and number of witnesses called by the prosecution. The signifi-
cance of this minimization should not be underestimated-a glance at
the McMartin statistics reveals its importance.247 Millions of taxpay-
ers' dollars and years of incarceration for defendants can be avoided
with a streamlined approach.
CONCLUSION
In 1990, the highly publicized McMartin trials outraged the Ameri-
can public. The failure of the criminal system to effectuate justice was
apparent to parties on both sides. 241 Although McMartin was by no
means a typical case, it was "the quintessentially abusive child sexual
abuse case .... [It became] a case about the vulnerability of both
defendants and children in a legal world of adults stumbling in their
search for the truth."2 4 9 The McMartin ordeal, "a textbook example
243. See supra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 126-34 and accompanying text.
246. See supra part II.B.
247. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
248. See Dziech & Schudson, supra note 16, at 184 ("One Los Angeles television
station that solicited viewers' responses after the verdict reported that 11,255 people
called in to say that justice had not been served, whereas only 1,663 believed that it
had.").
249. Dziech & Schudson, supra note 16, at 186.
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of everything that might go wrong in a child-molestation case,' 25 0 put
the legal process itself on trial.
The aftermath of McMartin has realized prosecutors' worst fears-
a heightened hesitancy to pursue criminal action in child sexual abuse
cases. McMartin warned supporters of victims around the nation that
children will not be believed, certainly not "beyond a reasonable
doubt."25' The doubts of those who dismissed the role of the criminal
courts in these cases seemingly were confirmed. 21 2 These critics erro-
neously view McMartin and similar cases as representative of the
criminal process as it must be; instead, these cases should be recog-
nized as highlighting the flaws of the system as currently constituted.
The heinous crime of child sexual abuse need not be exempted from
the rigors of the criminal justice system. As evidenced by the Madison
County experiment and its progeny, the criminal process can work for
both victims and defendants in these cases.
To withdraw these cases from the criminal process would be an in-justice to those abused and those falsely accused, but to maintain the
system presently implemented in the vast majority of jurisdictions is
an even greater tragedy. Ultimately, America cannot effectively bat-
tle the problem of child molestation until our criminal justice system
can avoid victimizing children and innocent defendants while success-
fully removing child abusers from society. As recognized by Robert
E. Cramer, Jr., district attorneys have "a responsibility to redesign the
system which [is] supposed to respond to child victims of sexual
abuse." 3 Only through systemic reform can the interests of justice
be served.
250. Gorney, supra note 188, at A6.
251. Dziech & Schudson, supra note 16, at 186; Summit, supra note 18, at 5.
252. See supra part I.A.
253. Cramer, supra note 202, at 216.
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